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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the process behind the debates
over how war and wartime events are represented in museums and memorials.
This thesis focuses on the controversies emerging around three separate warrelated exhibits/memorials: the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the Enola Gay
Exhibit at the National Air and Space Museum, and the Vietnam Era Educational
Center in Holmdel, New Jersey.
The intention of this thesis is to analyze the complex politics surrounding
issues of individual and collective memory and the historical representation of
war. The resulting research supports an argument for a new approach to public
presentations of wartime events which encourages debate and open discussion.
The Enola Gay controversy serves as the centerpiece for the discussion of
this topic. The Congressional Hearings held in relation to the failed exhibition
reveal the potential chilling factor that intense political involvement can have in
the engaged museum environment.
Rather than fearing the conflicting perspectives and emotions that multiple
people bring to any memorial or museum, curators, scholars, veterans, and
politicians should relish the opportunity to hear as many different realities as
possible and to catalog them all for the human record. Mounting a successful
exhibition in the future means acknowledging the fact that there are many stories
to be told and making every effort not to privilege one over the other.
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Introduction
The act of remembering war is surrounded by a complex set o f emotions. The
glory o f victory, the sadness o f loss, the brutality of violence - all o f these complicate
attempts to memorialize war. The harsh reality of war makes it difficult to celebrate,
perhaps explaining why most war memorials are statues, plaques or monuments - silent,
simple symbols of lives lost and battles won. Given the ubiquity of the United States’
peace-time armed forces, and the country’s status as one of the world’s “super powers,”
many veterans and politicians have moved to protest the construction o f memorials and
exhibits that challenge the reasons for and outcomes of American wars.
This thesis argues for a new approach to public presentations o f wartime events
which encourages debate and open discussion. Using oral histories, photographs,
government documents and artifacts to tell the stories of war, but also inviting historians,
veterans and others to interpret war in many ways will benefit museum visitors. A
broader and deeper exploration of war is necessary to ensure that no single voice is
privileged and that the multiple truths that surround any event can be revealed. This
thesis examines the process behind the debates over how wars and wartime events are
represented in museums and memorials. It involves researching the historiography that
influences the interpretations o f events offered in museum exhibitions as well as the ways
in which the concept of collective memory shapes responses to such exhibits.
This thesis focuses on the controversies emerging around three separate warrelated exhibits/ memorials: the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the National Air and Space
Museum’s Enola Gay exhibit, and the New Jersey Vietnam Veterans Educational Center.
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The intention of this thesis is to analyze the complex politics surrounding issues of
individual and collective memory and the historical representation o f war.
War arouses conflict, not only among the combatant nations, but also among those
who would revile it, commemorate it, oppose it, support it, study it and analyze it. War is
fascinating precisely because humankind seems to be unable to stop it from happening no
matter how irrational or unnecessary they deem it to be upon reflection. War is a
paradox: one group o f people dies to ensure that other groups of people do not perish.
Does human life even enter the equation? Is war really about ideology, religion,
ownership, or real estate? Historians and scholars have long struggled to answer these
questions, to explain war, to justify its continuous occurrence throughout human history.
It is necessary and important to pursue the meanings behind war and to discuss all
possibilities in order to uncover the realities o f conflict.
There are many forums for the examination o f historically significant events such
as war. The most significant arenas for this study are the museum and the memorial.
These are the places in the United States where people can go to see the nation’s history
on display. They commemorate everything from the birth o f the nation and westward
expansion to the injustice of slavery and the courage of those who participated in the civil
rights movement. War has touched every part of this country. The American
Revolution, the Civil War, World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam - all o f these
conflicts, and others more recent or less frequently mentioned, took American lives. All
of these conflicts affected the way everyday Americans lived, whether it meant defending
their homes against British troops in 1778, or fleeing to British lines as slaves to gain
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their freedom in that same war, or rationing food to provide more for Americans fighting
in Europe in 1944. Consequently, when Americans talk about war, they remember
different things. How is it possible to capture the perspectives o f thousands of people
who all remember a war in their own unique way?
War is what historian Arthur Neal calls a “national trauma.” Such traumas
“become ingrained in collective memories . . . Hearing or reading about an event does not
have the same implications as experiencing an event directly. However, as parts of the
social heritage, events from the past become selectively embedded in collective
memories.”1 It is, therefore, possible for almost anyone to participate in the collective
memory of an event, particularly in the mass media driven world of the early twenty-first
century. One of the best examples o f how Americans in particular participate in
collective memory is the “Where were you when . . . ” question. “Where were you when
JFK was assassinated?” “Where were you when MLK, Jr. was assassinated?” “Where
were you when the Challenger exploded?” These three events, in large part because of
the turbulence they created in society, elicit responses that indicate people have
incorporated those experiences into their memory, and that they “tap a responsive chord
in mass audiences.”2 The public is becoming more and more involved in interpreting
history, and they will not rely on the expertise of the museum alone to explain the past to
them. Museums can no longer rely on their authority as institutions to qualify them as

‘Arthur G. Neal, National Trauma and Collective Memory: Maior Events in the
American Century. (London: M.E. Sharpe), 6.
2Neal 203.
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experts in any one particular field of study, the art of exhibition included. Interest groups,
politicians, museum visitors, curators and museum administrators each have their own
ideas about how history, art, and artifacts should be exhibited. The public’s idea of how
historical exhibits should be mounted is sometimes very different from the scholar’s
focus. As scholars Amy Henderson and Adrienne Kaeppler note, “historians want to use
archives and objects; [where] the public more often turns to memory, personal
connections, and family stories,. . . historians are careful to assess the bias of their
sources [and] to question evidence .. .”3 In short, while individuals who were party to a
certain event have their own distinct memory of that event, historians must decide not just
\

which of these individual’s stories should be highlighted, but also whether or not there is
a single truth about any historical event. The question of exactly what is “historically
true” has been the source of great debate and the effects of this controversy have been felt
in the museum community.
The museum exhibit is a powerful mode of presenting American history. A visit
to a museum can be a very enlightening experience, for “the displayed collection finds its
unity in memory and narrative.”4 Steven Lubar, curator of the exhibit “World War II:
Sharing Memories” at the National Museum of American History, focuses on the
importance of incorporating memory into historical exhibits. Lubar contends that

3Henderson & Kaeppler, 16.
4Susan Stewart, “Death and Life, in that Order, in the Works of Charles Wilson
Peale,” The Cultures of Collecting (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 204.
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“memory is how we connect with our individual past. It serves our own purposes.”5
When memory is combined with pertinent historical narrative, including newspaper
articles and news reels, and with scholarly research that includes government documents,
a more representative, thorough exhibit results.

Museums serve the greatest number of

people by creating an exhibit with which they can identify and educating them by
including the latest scholarship, which might be profoundly different from their
remembrance o f any given event.
Museum visitors should not be alienated by an exhibit that does not resonate with
their memories; they are more likely to be willing to expand their horizons if their
perspective o f an event is acknowledged. Lubar agrees; to him the “goal o f a history
exhibit is to move people from the ideas and information that they bring with them to the
exhibit to a more complex, problematized, and nuanced view of the past.”6 The
disjunction between memory and history can be breeched by incorporating both, and
smoothing the transition with a narrative that stretches the viewers’ memories of an event
without disregarding their personal connections. Exhibits of the American and Japanese
homefronts during the final days of World War n, for example, would have made a
critical impact on a visitor to the Enola Gay exhibit at the National Air and Space
Museum. Such additions would have provided insight into how the Japanese were
personally effected by the use of nuclear weapons at the close of the war. Pictures or

5Amy Henderson & Adrienne L. Kaeppler, eds.. Exhibiting Dilemmas: Issues of
Representation at the Smithsonian. “Exhibiting Memories,” by Steven Lubar
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997), 15.
6Henderson & Kaeppler, 16.
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recreations of settings or scenes are particularly important because place memory helps
“citizens [to] define their public pasts: places trigger memories for insiders . . . and at the
same time places often can represent shared pasts to outsiders who might be interested in
knowing about them in the present.”7 Visitors could identify with the effects of the war
on all phases o f life if more than just the impact felt by those in combat was presented.
Education o f the visitor is a critical goal of any museum experience. In their book
titled The Museum Experience. John Falk and Lynn Dierking emphasize that learning is
“the consolidation and slow, incremental growth of existing ideas and information.”8
Therefore, those who learn the most from an exhibit are those who come in with basic
knowledge o f the subject matter or a high interest level in the particular area o f study
being presented. They are most likely to carefully read label text and ponder historical
information that is new to them. These individuals are probably also more likely to have
had a previous personal experience, including knowledge gained from relatives, with the
subject matter. In relating this concept of “learning” to military exhibits, the needs and
expectations of visitors become more apparent: veterans and their families want an
exhibit that reflects what they see as their memory of the events; historians and curators
want an exhibit with which visitors can identify, but they also need to utilize current
scholarship to discuss events because the multiple truths that surround any event
constantly reveal new insights into its causes and consequences. It is possible and

7Dolores Hayden, The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), 46.
8Lynn Dierking and John Falk, eds. The Museum Experience. (New York:
Whalesback Books, 1992), 98.
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necessary to incorporate memories, historical objects, and narrative into a successful and
accurate museum exhibition.
Because museums rely on historical scholarship to explain the significance of the
objects (photographs, clothing, weapons, planes) they are displaying, the museum and the
historian are intimately linked. Until the early 1970's, most museums or museum
presentations of history were through the consensus school o f history. Consensus history
emerged in the 1950's because of “the new American position in the world, the memories
of national unity in World War II, the pressures of the Cold War, and the confidence o f
most Americans that they could now participate in a rapidly growing prosperity.”9
Consensus historians asserted that there is a fundamental unity in American society
despite all of the outward conflicts; “tradition, seen as a common core of ideas and
experiences and supportive of the concept of the nation as a whole”10 ranks over the
vision of an ideal democracy as a shaping force; there is a single national narrative, and
the dominant voice in that narrative belongs to the wealthy and politically powerful white
man. Thus consensus school historians most often studied the lives of prominent
individuals and their contributions to history. Consensus historians rarely challenged the
‘why’ of historical events and tended to produce scholarship that was remarkably
consistent with the views presented in the ‘official’ histories produced by government
sources.

9Emst Breisach, Historiography: Ancient. Medieval, and Modem (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1994), 387.
,0Ibid.
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However, consensus scholarship was largely eclipsed by revisionist scholarship in
the 1970's. It was at this point that the museum began its still ongoing transformation
from a temple for enshrining artifacts to a forum for the discussion of an artifact’s
significance.11 The revisionist school of history developed during the late 1960's and
challenged the unified outlook on history constructed by the consensus scholars - they
were specifically disenchanted with the consensus school’s unquestioning acceptance of
what revisionists saw as Washington propaganda. Revisionists were disillusioned by the
failure of other historians to challenge the status quo; they recognized the need to talk
about groups of people rather than individuals.
Emerging from the social history focus o f the ‘60's and ‘70's, many historians in
the late 1970's found that “a purely white, elitist cultural diet [was] no longer tenable or
desirable.”12 Multiculturalist scholars further diversified the many perspectives on
history. Historians with the multicultural viewpoint are not satisfied with the Revisionist/
Consensus debate over the history of dominant individuals and cultures because
multicultural scholars argue against a single national narrative, and encourage the
exploration and representation of groups that have been ignored by historians - these
groups include, among others, the poor, African-Americans, women, Native Americans,
Hispanic/Latino Americans and Asian-Americans. Multiculturalism has the potential to

"Ivan Karp and Steven D. Lavine, eds.. Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and
Politics of Museum Display. “Museums and Multiculturalism” (Washington:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 3.
12Peter N. Steams. Multiculturalism: Meaning Over Memory - Recasting the
Teaching o f Culture and History (Chapel Hill: UNC-CH Press, 1993), 6.
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greatly influence the museum community by causing its members to “explore this
multicultural and intercultural terrain consciously and deliberately, in spite o f the snares
that may await,. . . reflecting and mediating the claims o f various groups and perhaps
helpfing] construct a new idea o f ourselves as a nation.”13
Analyzing one war memorial and specific military history exhibits at two
museums reveals the necessity o f adopting a multicultural approach to history in order to
convey the stories o f as many different people as possible. The experiences o f those on
the homefront, in field hospitals, on the supply lines and on the battlefield in wartime are
as important as those o f the president, the generals, and others in positions of power.
Historians and scholars who seek to reveal the lapses in American history do so to
educate the public about the many possible interpretations of the past, and to warn those
who would hide the mistakes of the country that they are in fact perpetuating a dangerous
self-righteousness. Historian Martin Sherwin captured the essence of this problem when
he said, “Those who insist on only their memories o f the past, condemn others to remain
ignorant o f it.” 14

,3Karp and Lavine, 6.
14Martin Sherwin, “Hiroshima as Politics and History,” The Journal o f American
History, Vol.82, No.3 (December 1995):1091.
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Exhibiting Controversy
The debate about different interpretations of American history spills over into the
museum world and ignites controversies over “value-laden presentation/’ “questionable
interpretation,” and a lack o f divergent viewpoints. In other words, using objects to
forward a personal or political viewpoint or privileging one group’s story over another’s,
as this thesis will show, can and does cause controversy. These disputes, sometimes
initiated by historians and sometimes by special interest groups, have pushed museum
officials to rethink, and often rework, exhibitions. Something as simple as the placement
of an object in an exhibit or in the museum can become a thorn in the side of any
curator.15 Lighting, label text and object choice go a long way in subtly (or sometimes
blatantly) revealing a curator’s historical and scholarly opinion about her or his subject.
Designing an exhibition to reflect a single opinion about an event or era is difficult at best
and always invites controversy. This dilemma has been seen everywhere from the “The
West as America” exhibit at the National Museum o f American Art to the Los Angeles
County Museum o f Art exhibit o f Nazi-confiscated “Degenerate” Art to Colonial
Williamsburg’s presentation of eighteenth century slave life. Museums dealing with
American history in particular find that they are continuously confronted with a past “shot

,5In his essay, “Exhibiting Intention,” Michael Baxandall notes that the mere
placement of an object “by itself or on a wall. . . [makes it] worthy of inspection . . . for
it’s cultural importance . . . It is spotlit for some purpose.” Highlighting one object
privileges it in an exhibit and sets the tone for the viewer’s perception of the exhibit as a
whole and the museum. Baxandall’s essay is found in Karp and Lavine’s Exhibiting
Cultures: The Poetics and Politics o f Museum Display. (Washington: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1991), 34.
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through with social, cultural, generational, economic, and psychological conflicts.”16
Military history exhibits, including the three discussed in this analysis, have been
especially controversial because of the implied association of glorious victory with death
and violence, and the memories o f living veterans who want to see the war displayed and
discussed the way they remember it. Even those war exhibits which receive generally
positive reviews from the majority o f visitors will still receive some negative feedback.
“Gone for a Soldier: Transformed by War,” a temporary exhibit at the Atlanta History
Center is one example o f an exhibition which received both positive and negative
feedback from visitors. Though the exhibit presented information which revealed the
harshness of being a soldier in the Civil War, it neglected to include the important roles
o f women in its examination and it marginalized the efforts of black soldiers.17
The 1979 crusade to establish a memorial for Vietnam Veterans, the 1995
exhibition o f the Enola Gay, the recently opened Vietnam Veterans Memorial Museum in
Holmdel, NJ, and other controversial exhibitions o f war-related memorabilia have pushed
veterans, politicians, historians, and museum curators into a battle o f their own. Whose
history will be privileged in the effort to bring the events o f war to the American public?
Whose story will be told? What perspective will be taken? How will wars of the past be
remembered in museums, and how will that visual memory affect future generations?

16Thomas J. Schlereth, Cultural History and Material Culture: Everyday Life.
Landscapes. Museums (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1990), 362.
17Jim Cullen, review of “Gone for a Soldier: Transformed by the War,” at the
Atlanta History Center, The Journal o f American History, Vol.82 No.3 (December
1995):1151-4.
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War is most often represented through exhibits of weaponry, uniforms, and
memorabilia like letters, drawings, and photographs. American conflicts from the
Revolutionary War through World War II are presented this way, even in the National
Museum of American History. Sterile glass cases house uniforms on mannequins - the
faded tattered reds and blues of the War for American Independence, the blues and grays
o f the American Civil War, the drab gray-green o f the First and Second World Wars.
Swords, some in their sheaths, some bare, are polished like-new. The development of
gunpowder weapons can be traced from flintlock muskets and cannons through to
modern-day artillery. Everything is washed clean; there is no blood on the bayonets, nor
are their stains on any of the uniforms. What are the implications of displaying a uniform
in which someone died? The power of associating an object with the end of an

«*

individual’s life is most often avoided in military history museums. In the Holocaust
Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. the room o f shoes reminds the visitor that the
people who owned those shoes died in the Nazi concentration camps. The impact is
powerful and lasting - the image of the shoes stacked high to the ceiling is difficult to
forget. Why not, then, display a bloodied uniform as a reminder that war inevitably
means death for some of those who fight in it? War represented in museums has often
been antiseptic - one could argue that presenting those artifacts is a way of cleansing the
collective American soul. Displaying clean uniforms, neatly pressed and worn by
mannequins makes war seem more civilized and less brutal. Though it would seem to
contradict most veterans’ wishes for an accurate representation o f war, the lack of
bloodied uniforms seems to glorify the “fighting man” by making him seem above injury.
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Until recently, the general public had never seen a more realistic view of war in a
museum.
In addition to weapons and uniforms the most common other memorabilia to be
displayed are letters and pictorial representations of war. The War Memorial Museum in
Hampton, VA, along with its conventional chronological exhibit of conflicts involving
American troops, houses one o f the largest collections o f World War II propaganda
posters in the country. Many military posts house celebratory museums on their
premises, including the Army Transportation Museum in Fort Eustis, VA, the 82nd
Airborne Museum at Ft. Bragg, NC, the Museum of the Infantry at Ft. Benning, GA, the
Gulf War Museum at Ft. Stewart, GA, and the Quartermaster’s Museum at Ft. A.P. Hill,
VA. There are thousands of monuments and memorials as well. Washington, D.C. is the
site of the Korean War Memorial, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, and the National Air
and Space Museum, which some would argue actually serves as a monument to American
air power, the Cold War, and the space race. Battlefield sites from the Revolutionary and
Civil War are scattered up and down the east coast and in the west and southwest regions
of the United States, marked prominently with road signs and often further
commemorated with visitor centers, walking tours, and re-enactments. These are sacred
ground to many Americans, which was proved most recently in 1993-94 when Disney
announced a plan to open a history theme park in Prince William County, Virginia which
would include the Manassas battlefield. Public outcry from groups including the
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, the Southern Environmental Law Center, and the American
Farmland Trust against the commercialization of history, among other concerns, forced
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Disney to abandon the idea even though they had won local and state approval for the
park18.
Perhaps the significance of memorializing war exists in the desire of many
Americans to find common threads to bind them as a people. The history o f the United
States is strongly linked to wars from its founding to the present. Through a war the
United States was established as a free nation, and the current military force is one factor
that enables the nation to remain a major world power. When the history of American
warfare is reconsidered by historians and scholars as new evidence emerges, many
Americans cannot help feeling that the historical rug is being pulled out from under them.
Though their “memories may contribute to the construction o f history. . . history does not
necessarily validate (those) m emories].”19 To some observers, the distance between their
memories and history threatens to diminish the sacrifice made by so many during
wartime.
Most curators have an agenda for their exhibits: a specific lesson must be taught, a
particular myth exploded, an individual exalted or reviled. A select group of people,
including, but certainly not limited to, curators and museum administrators, decides what
to present and how to present it. With this power comes a great deal o f responsibility - if
one story or event or person is to be privileged in an exhibit then the reason for that must
be clear. When people feel that their stories are not important, that the emotions and

18Michael P. Brooks, “Getting Goofy in Virginia: The Politics of Disneyfication.”
http://www.asu.edu/caed/proceedings97/brooks.html, 1997.
19Sherwin, 1091.
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memories being presented are not theirs, then they will challenge the curator’s choice.
This is particularly true “in the arena of contemporary history20 . . . [where] audiences
have more connection with a historical moment.”21 Visitors for whom a particular event,
in this case war, has direct meaning “may be less likely to defer to curatorial prerogative .
.. [and] this sense o f ownership creates a wave of criticism that museums are often
unable to handle.”22
According to Elaine Heumann Gurian, “an exhibition is a cultural artifice that
articulates a producer’s visions, biases, and concerns . . . [and] allows the contemplation
of the exhibition content.”23 She goes on to compare the mounting o f an exhibition to the
production of a theater piece; “exhibitions are formed by a group o f people who have
highly individualized visions and styles, in a process in which compromise is the order of
the day.”24 That same group of people use their beliefs and values to make decisions “to
emphasize one element and to downplay others, to assert some truths and to ignore

20For the purposes o f this study, contemporary history is defined as the time period
from World War II to the present; this also represents the period which many living today
still remember from their experiences.
21Ibid, 153.
22Amy Henderson & Adrienne L. Kaeppler, eds.. Exhibiting Dilemmas: Issues of
Representation at the Smithsonian. “Curating the Recent Past: The Woolworth Lunch
Counter, Greensboro, North Carolina,” by William Yeingst & Lonnie G. Bunch
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997), 152.
23Ivan Karp and Steven D. Lavine, eds., Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and
Politics of Museum Display. “Noodling Around with Exhibition Opportunities,” by
Elaine Heumann Gurian (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 178.
24Karp and Lavine, 188.
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others.”25 The same holds true for the creators of the three controversial military
‘exhibits’ this thesis will examine.26 The term creator refers not only to the curators and
historians who write label text and design displays, it also refers to the artists who push
the concepts, the politicians, veterans groups, and individuals who attempt to insert their
own agendas into the construction process, and those who work tirelessly to compromise
and to bring a critical message to the viewing public in spite o f all obstacles.
The Three Exhibits
The “Wall,” or the Vietnam Memorial, was intended to be a memorial to those
who died in Vietnam. Jan Scruggs and his fellow veterans specifically wanted a
remembrance that did not reference foreign policy decisions - the absence of an American
flag or some other patriotic symbol in their design of choice was deliberate.27 In turn, the
National Air and Space Museum’s curators wanted to use the Enola Gay as the
centerpiece o f “an historical treatment of the use of atomic weapons [coupled] with the
50th anniversary commemoration o f the end of the war.”28 Finally, the Vietnam Era
Educational Center curators wanted to present the war abroad and at home in a balanced

25Karp and Lavine, 1.
26Though the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (The Wall) is not truly an exhibit, I will
call it one for the purposes of this analysis because of the clear way in which it introduces
the primary elements and players in subsequent controversies over the exhibition of
military artifacts.
27“Facts About the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Collection,” The Vietnam ^
Veterans Memorial Reader’s Series, http://www.nps.gov/mrc/reader/wmcr.htm
28I. Michael Heyman, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, in a news
conference held January 30,1995.
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context with respect for all parties.29 All o f these goals were foiled or stalled by the
agendas of politicians and veterans groups.
The fate o f these three exhibits raises questions that will most likely never have
complete answers. How can exhibits relate one person’s memory of an event to the
historical “facts” o f the event? Does memory become truth when it symbolizes
something significant for a particular community? Is history complete without the use of
memories? What, exactly, is memory? Is it only individual? Is there such a thing as
collective memory? In his book, Arthur G. Neal traces the existence o f a collective
memory back to before the founding of the United States of America:
Humans take an active part in determining what their collective memories will be
. . . [they] may be thought o f as a storehouse of information on how problems
were confronted and solved in the p a s t . . . Collective memories thus incorporate
not only the tragedies o f the past, but also the heroic accomplishments . . . [and]
are drawn upon to tap a responsive chord in mass audiences . . . to support a
political position or to document the urgency of avoiding a particular line of
action . . . The significance of collective memories lies less in their accuracy than
in the meanings they have for their adherents.30
Memory is not merely an individual’s perception o f an event. Even groups of
people who witnessed the same event remember it in different ways, though their
collective memories may be similar. The proliferation of media influences collective
memory by using a particular vision of an event to communicate a broad message about
its impact. There are several readily identifiable instances of this occurrence. The
footage of Buddhist monks immolating themselves to protest the Vietnam war and the

29The Vietnam Era Educational Center Brochure
30Neal, 202-6.
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picture o f the young Vietnamese child who was caught in a napalm attack are two
provocative examples. It is difficult to erase the images o f men sitting calmly while their
bodies are engulfed in flames or o f the naked child running down the road, her skin
hanging off her body like tattered clothing. Fictional representations o f war in movies
like The Big Red One and A Bridge Too Far, evoke heroic sentiments about World War
II, while films like Saving Private Ryan and The Thin Red Line depict men, some good
and some not so good, who struggle to justify their presence in a bloody conflict. These
pictures and movies help shape impressions o f war for those who have never experienced
it - people who were not there and who have never participated in a war effort may even
feel as though they have missed a critical part o f the “American experience.” These
films, some based on truth, others romanticized visions, are as much a part o f the
collective memory of any war as the oral history of those who were there.
Military history, already riddled with government documents, policy makers, and
casualties, also carries the burden of justification. It is important to address questions of
mission, purpose, consequences, and sacrifices. Government documents may provide a
running commentary on the decision-making process, but they offer only the official and
possibly propagandist^ perspective, and do not tell us what it was like to be there in the
line of fire, how difficult it was to keep the troops constantly supplied with vehicles and
ammunition, or how those on the homefront were experiencing work environments they
had never had access to before the war. Memory is a critical and necessary part of
history. There is no one single, absolute truth - memories prove that each person
remembers the same event from a different perspective. To accommodate the many,
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varying viewpoints curators must remember that no history is complete without the
addition of memories, individual and collective.
The Wall - The Vietnam Veterans Memorial
Bringing the history o f armed conflict out of the standard, celebratory military
history museum setting and into a more broadly public arena has sparked a debate about
how to depict the brutality and reality o f war without denigrating those who risked their
lives for the cause. War artifacts and memorials become symbolic o f the political turmoil
that is associated with conflict in general. Vietnam veteran Jan Scruggs, Jr. first
envisioned a Vietnam Veterans Memorial in 1979, after he realized that for “the faces of
the dead and . . . their names . . . there were to be no memorials, no public images that
might rally a nation or comfort those who lived on.”31 He returned home one evening
after seeing The Deerhunter and was inspired by “the possibility o f a community healing
itself.”32 He and fellow veteran Tom Carhart wanted a memorial that would allow
Vietnam veterans to be honored and remembered without reference to United States
foreign policy. A competition, funded by Ross Perot, was held for the design o f the
memorial, and in May 1981 a panel o f jurors selected from among approximately 1,500
entries what quickly became a controversial submission. Vietnam veteran Lewis B.
Puller, Jr., son o f the famous and highly decorated Marine ‘Chesty* Puller, described his

31Edward T. Linenthal & Tom Engelhardt, eds., History Wars: The Enola Gav and
Other Battles for the American Past. “The Victors and the Vanquished,” by Tom
Engelhardt ( New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 218.
32Kristin Ann Hass, Carried to the Wall: American Memory and the Vietnam
Veterans Memorial (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998), 10.
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initial impressions o f the memorial:
As I read about the winning entry, designed by a woman undergraduate at Yale
named Maya Lin, I pictured two black walls containing the names o f all those
killed in Vietnam. The walls were going to form a V shape and be built into a
hillside on the Mall one arm pointing toward the Lincoln Memorial and the other
toward the Washington Monument. It seemed like a perfectly appropriate, albeit
unconventional, design to me, although I would have preferred that it had been
submitted by a Vietnam veteran. Little did I realize that a major battle would take
place before the memorial became a reality.33
The flurry o f controversy that followed was set in motion by veterans, including
Carhart, and others who felt that the memorial was “insufficiently patriotic.”34 This group
of veterans, along with some congress people, members o f the Reagan administration,
and Perot desired a “heroic memorial.” Opponents of the wall design attacked Maya
Lin’s creation as a “mass grave” and a “black gash o f shame,” and intervened in the
process by blocking a construction permit for the memorial. In the end, a “heroic statue
and an American flag” were placed near Maya Lin’s wall. The fact that Lin was Asian,
like the Vietnamese, and female, and therefore ineligible for combat, was certainly a part
o f the controversy. Puller himself admitted that he would rather a Vietnam veteran had
designed the memorial. Many found it difficult to imagine that a female who had never
experienced the horror of the war could possibly communicate the grief and loss that so
many had experienced. To placate the protestors, a statue of three soldiers was added to
the memorial, which Lin protested, saying “that it was like ‘drawing a moustache’ on her

33Puller, Lewis B, Jr. Fortunate Son. New York: Bantam Books, 1991.
34Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990 (New York: Harper
Perennial, 1991), 328.
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design.”35 Officials and their followers who preferred “to commemorate the Vietnam
War in the ideal language o f patriotism rather than the real language of grief and
sorrow”36won the day. Since the wall’s dedication in 1982, streams o f people have
visited the memorial daily, some to find the names of friends and loved ones lost in the
conflict, others to stare awestruck at the desolation of those two granite slabs bearing
more than 50,000 names of Americans missing and dead in the sixteen years that America
was in Vietnam.
Though most see what has become known simply as “The Wall” as a memorial to
those who served in Vietnam, there are others who have tapped into its significance and
have used the memorial as a site for protests against conflicts that seem similar, like the
American involvement in El Salvador in the 1980's. The sometimes disparate visions of
Scruggs and his fellow veterans are easily projected onto current events by those who
seek to link the political aspects o f a past conflict with present day policy issues.
T he Enola Gay

The controversy surrounding the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was simply a
prelude to future debates over the appropriate representation of war. When the Enola
Gay sat rusting on an air strip from 1953 to 1960, many veterans were outraged.
However, none of them could agree on the appropriate way to exhibit the historically
significant plane. In 1970 Barry Goldwater declared that the plane did not belong in the

35Young, 328.
36John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory. Commemoration, and
Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 14.
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National Air and Space Museum (NASM). In the same year, Congressman Frank
Thompson stated that he would be offended to see it exhibited in any museum, even one
run by the Air Force. The Enola Gay spent almost fifty years in isolation because the
very presence o f the plane evoked an almost unspeakable act. When the decision was
finally made to exhibit the Enola Gay at the National Air and Space Museum (NASM),
the plane was meant to be the centerpiece of an exhibit that linked the Cold War and
nuclear proliferation to the explosion of the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima:
The curators at the NASM were eager to present the Enola Gay, the B-29 bomber
that dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, as the central icon in an exhibit
that was to examine the bomb’s creation, the decision to use it against Japanese
cities, the Enola Gay*s mission, the ground-level effects of atomic weaponry, the
bomb’s role in ending the war, and the new era it inaugurated - as well as the ways
in which decades o f historical research and debate on these topics had altered and
deepened our understanding of them.37
The response to this proposal is a recent example o f how divergent viewpoints on
a historical event can alter the way it is presented to and received by the public. The
veterans were expecting an exhibit that celebrated the end of World War II and the defeat
o f the Japanese, not an in-depth investigation into the effects of nuclear armament. By
employing discoveries made in recently declassified paperwork, the initial exhibit script
challenged longstanding historical data about the reasons for using atomic weapons and
the decisions that President Truman made leading up to the Enola Gay*s mission. It came
as no surprise to Martin O. Harwit, the NASM director forced to resign in the midst of the
controversy, that many, including the Japanese, viewed the future exhibit with
skepticism:
37Linenthal & Engelhardt, 2.
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No group was prepared to trust the museum to tell its story the way it had always
been told and the way it always had to be told, if honor was to be maintained . . .
The originators o f an exhibition have responsibility for taking into account the
latest scholarship, to be sure, but they must also gauge their audience.38
Harwit intended to mount an exhibition that would honor everyone’s memories
while exposing them to new truths about the events surrounding the end o f World War II.
His plan proved to be impossible in the political climate at the Smithsonian Institution.
Whatever support had existed for the exhibit during the planning stages in the early
nineties disappeared when the first script was publicized. The debate that raged around
this exhibit exemplified “the confrontation between popular memory and patriotic
affirmation on the one hand, and the norms o f historical research on the other.”39 Like the
Vietnam veterans memorial before it, the Enola Gay exhibit plan was stalled by a lengthy
review process. The report of the ‘Tiger Team,” a group invited by Harwit to review the
script and which was chaired by retired Brigadier General William Constantine and
included several Air Force veterans, called the exhibit unbalanced and accused the
original script’s authors of being overly sympathetic to the Japanese, portraying them as
victims rather than aggressors.40 Ultimately, neither side emerged victorious. The
museum, facing budget cuts and the threat of congressional oversight, scrapped the

38Martin Harwit, “Academic Freedom in ‘The Last Act’,” The Journal o f
American History, Vol.82, No. 3 (December 1995): 1072.
39Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt, eds., History Wars: The Enola Gay
and other Battles for the American Past. “Whose History is it Anyway?: Memory,
Politics, and Historical Scholarship,” by Paul Boyer ( New York: Metropolitan Books,
1996), 137-8.
40Tiger Team Report citation
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original script, attempted a rewrite which, though much better, was also denied,
eventually abandoned any attempt to address the nuclear issue, and instead went with a
bare-bones exhibit on the restoration of the plane.
In their quest to present an exhibit that challenged the popular American memory
o f the end o f World War II, the curators at the NASM relied heavily on historians’
debates about the accuracy of facts surrounding the decision to drop the bomb. Among
the most highly contested pieces of information offered by the exhibit were the casualty
estimates that would have resulted from a land invasion o f the home island o f Japan.
New research shows that those figures were not unanimously agreed upon, and that there
was evidence that Japanese leaders were making motions to surrender so the bomb was
unnecessary. Moreover, theories that Truman dropped the bomb to threaten the Soviets
are gaining more credence. This issue became a hot button for veterans groups and
politicians opposed to the Enola Gay exhibit because to them the initial script seemed to
devalue the lives that were saved because of the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. Some historians were not content to allow their carefully researched
revisions of historical events to be overshadowed by the widely accepted memory of the
factors behind Truman’s decision to use atomic weapons in the Pacific Theater o f World
War n. As one of the exhibit’s creators noted, “the confrontation between popular
memory and patriotic affirmation on the one hand, and the norms of historical research
and argument on the other, could hardly be more starkly revealed.’*41
Analysis of the original Enola Gay exhibit plan raises many questions about the
41Ibid.
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intentions and perspectives of its planners. The first problem was that the proposed
exhibit was meant to center around the Enola Gay, or at least that was the way it had been
planned at the NASM. It was surprising then to find that the actual plane was mentioned
only twice in the January 1994 script. The majority o f the exhibit was not dedicated to
the Enola Gay, but to the effects of the bombs upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The
artifacts and pictures were almost solely from Japan, and there was no mention of the
crew o f the Enola Gay. In fact, the only American serviceman mentioned in the entire
exhibit was Captain Claude Eatherly who flew a weather plane over Hiroshima one hour
before the Enola Gay delivered its payload.42 It is not difficult to understand why there
were some who were concerned about the balance of the exhibit. Certainly, the
Smithsonian had accurately portrayed the devastating aftermath of the explosion of two
nuclear weapons over two Japanese cities, and this clearly met their goal of questioning
nuclear armament. However, in a museum that had in the past been a bastion of support
for American air power, eliminating any discussion of the American military proved
unacceptable to veterans groups and conservative politicians. Veterans were upset at
what they saw as an unbalanced portrayal of the end of the war in the Pacific.43 It is hard
to visualize where the Enola Gay would have been placed had the original exhibit gone
up at the NASM. If the exhibit was intended to be centered strictly around the discussion
o f nuclear weaponry and its effects, then the Enola Gay, even though the bomber dropped

42Enola Gay exhibit script draft. EG:400, January 12,1994, 61-8.
43John T. Correll, "A Report on the Revisions” Air Force Magazine. June 28,
1994 http://www.afa.org/enolagay/04-06.html
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the only atomic bomb ever used in warfare, should have been a peripheral part of the
display. More appropriate centerpieces the museum might have considered include
objects from the Manhattan Project and disarmed nuclear weapons.
The January 1995 version of the exhibit, “The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and
the End o f World War n ,” appeared to have many improvements. The committee gained
balance as it expanded its scope to include details o f the Japanese-American conflict up to
and beyond the destruction o f Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Enola Gay becomes an
object around which the discussion of nuclear power and its use can move with surprising
ease. The plane is clearly a part of the exhibit. It is discussed in the context of the actual
bombing and in terms of the technology o f the World War II era. Its restoration is
highlighted and the crew are mentioned in some detail. The brutality of war is shown
with no apologies - both Japan and the U.S. are portrayed as aggressively pursuing the
war, from Pearl Harbor to Nagasaki. There is some significant discussion about
alternatives to using the atomic bomb and relevant government documents are cited.44
The exhibit achieves an appropriate combination o f education and presentation. Visitors
to the exhibit would most likely have left with new information about the Enola Gay and
nuclear power, and they would have been given the opportunity to decide for themselves
whether or not the bomb should have been used against Japan.
The concern that most historians and scholars have about the Smithsonian’s
decision to scrap what appeared to be a very balanced exhibit, forged in the spirit of

44The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II, January 1995
(exhibit script)
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compromise, is critical to understanding why military exhibits in particular will continue
to be controversial. The very nature of war is aggressive; there is nothing fair or nice
about it. Any questioning of tactical decisions made in wartime somehow seems to
negate the risks taken by those who fought and died to implement those decisions.
Questioning something like the use of nuclear weapons to end World War II creates
opposition from those who feel that their lives were saved because they did not have to
invade Japan. They were not the only ones who felt threatened by a less than positive
endorsement o f Truman’s decision; conservative politicians were troubled enough to hold
a Senate Hearing on Enola Gay. Chairman Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) said in his
introductory remarks that the hearings “will provide the Smithsonian with the public
forum necessary to explain what went wrong with their management practices, and what
steps have been taken to correct the revisionist and ‘politically correct’ bias that was
contained in the original script.”45 Stevens use of the terms revisionist and politically
correct as negative labels for the original exhibit highlight his and many other
conservative politicians’ view that those who wrote the original script felt that dropping
the bomb was wrong and wanted to mount an exhibition that vilified both that decision
and the men who executed it. Five other senators attended the hearing: John Warner (RVA), Thad Cochran (R-MS), Wendell Ford (D-KY), Claiborne Pell (D-RI), and Dianne
Feinstein (D-CA). Also in attendance was Representative Sam Johnson (R-TX), the chair
of the committee, who commented, “There is no excuse for an exhibit that addresses one
45Page Putnam Miller, Director o f the National Coordinating Committee for the
Promotion of History, H-Asia “Enola Gay” Thread, http://www2.hnet.msu.edu/~asia/threads/thrdenola.html
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of the most morally unambiguous events of the 20th century to need five revisions.’*46
According to Stevens, the Senate Hearing’s stated objective was “not to tear down
the Smithsonian but to ensure continuing public support o f that great institution.”47 To
that end, the Committee on Rules and Administration, which has oversight of the
Smithsonian, held two days of testimony. On Thursday, May 11, 1995 they heard from
the Smithsonian’s critics who echoed a theme first addressed by Stevens in his opening
remarks, that something “went wrong with the Smithsonian’s process, particularly what
led the Smithsonian to propose a view of the events that took place at the end o f World
War II that is contrary to the memory of those who lived through the war.”48 The
following Thursday, May 18,1995, Smithsonian supporters testified. Professor Edward
Linenthal, who had served on the advisory committee for the NASM’s proposed Enola
Gay exhibit, was first to speak. He attempted to provide some background for
controversial exhibits and memorials like Little Big Horn and the U.S.S. Arizona. He
also made it clear that he understood his obligation as a historian to “attend to this

46 Testimony criticizing the Smithsonian Institution and the NASM was given by
Major General Charles W. Sweeney, USAF (Ret.), who flew on both atomic missions;
Colonel Charles C. Cooper, Director of Publications, The Retired Officers Association
(TROA); Herman G. Harrington, Chairman, National Internal Affairs Commission,
American Legion; R. E. Smith, National President, Air Force Association (AFA); and
Bob Manhan, Assistant Director, National Legislative Service, Veterans o f Foreign Wars
(VFW). Edward T. Linenthal, Professor o f Religion and American Culture, University of
Wisconsin-Oshkosh; I. Michael Heyman, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution; Constance
B. Newman, Undersecretary, Smithsonian Institution; and Thomas D. Crouch, Assistant
Director for Aeronautics, NASM, testified in support of the Smithsonian Institution and
the NASM. The hearings were held on May 11 and 18, 1995.
47U.S. Congress, Senate 1995, 2.
48Ibid.
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[commemorative] voice, to listen carefully. . . [to] survivors.”49 Linenthal also
acknowledged the complications involved in attempting to balance the heroic and tragic
narrative o f the Bomb. Others spoke that day, but the response from the committee to any
defense of the exhibit’s original intention can be summed up in the comments of Senator
Wendell H. Ford:
It seems the professor [Linenthal] now is writing a chapter as it relates to this
controversy. Whoever reads it is going to have his interpretation of who the had
guys are and who the good guys are, who wore the black hats and who wore the
white hats . . . Your interpretation o f this incident is going to be read by a lot of
people, and they are going to believe it because it is the only one they have read ..
. You start interpreting what happened here from all the reading, and we have
some information, you have other information . . . And you will not, in your
chapter, talk about the information we have . . . We are all caught in a Catch 22,
and the politician will get the blame. You will get a royalty, and I hope that it is
controversial enough that you make a lot o f money.50
The Enola Gay exhibit, like any collection intended for public viewing is shaped
and influenced by the opinions and backgrounds of the collectors, the agenda of the
organization funding the collection, and the museum in which the collection will be
housed. With all of these competing priorities, it becomes difficult to determine how
certain collected items will be interpreted first by the curators o f the exhibit, and second
by the museum-going public. There is no way of knowing what the public’s reaction
would have been if the 1995 Enola Gay exhibit had survived to completion. It is likely
that the complaints of veterans would have been echoed by others, but the fact that many
Americans who have no direct attachment to the memory o f World War II might have left

49U.S. Congress, Senate 1995, 47.
50U.S. Congress, Senate 1995, 63-4.
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the exhibition with a new set o f truths to ponder cannot be discounted.
The central problem with challenging the popular memory of World War II is that
there are very few Americans who have no connection whatsoever to what historian Studs
Terkel, in his collection o f personal anecdotes about the era, calls the last “Good War.”
Alongside those thankful veterans are their families, who may, like one angry man who
telephoned a historian to criticize his recently published viewpoint on the use of the
atomic bomb, credit their own existence to Truman’s decision:
While fellow historians and other scholars reacted positively, the scattered
responses from outside academe proved uniformly hostile. An early-moming
telephone call, for example, came from a gentleman . . . who, though bom after
the war, was the son of a veteran who had fought in the Pacific. My caller
therefore insisted that he also owed his life to the atomic bomb, since if his future
father had died in an invasion o f Japan, he, the son, would never have been
conceived.51
The larger implication o f that comment seems to be that the destruction o f Hiroshima and
Nagasaki was extremely beneficial for the descendants of all servicemen who were
stationed in the Pacific Theater and would likely have been involved in an invasion of
Japan. Their memory of this event has been shaped by the personal effects they perceive
it had upon their lives and by the belief that all wars the United States fought (until
Vietnam) were conducted with honor, righteousness and justice. The Smithsonian
underestimated the importance o f that shared memory in choosing the fiftieth anniversary
of the end o f World War II to question what is still largely seen by the public as a wise
decision that saved many American, and Japanese, lives.
Was there any way that the NASM could have incorporated public memory into
5,Linenthal and Engelhardt, 137.

their planned exhibition? As early as August 1993 the Air Force Association (AFA) was
involved in following up on reports from a group o f B-29 veterans who felt that the
NASM was “going wrong” with its plans for the Enola Gay exhibit.52 The Retired
Officers Association (TROA) became involved in the spring o f 1994 and contacted Dr.
Martin Harwit to discuss their concerns. A luncheon was arranged which included
representatives from the AFA, the American Legion, Disabled American Veterans, the
Military Order of the World Wars, TROA, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Also
present were staff members of the NASM, the Department o f Defense 50th Anniversary
Commemorative Committee, and the House Veterans Affairs Committee. The discussion
at the luncheon was lively and TROA followed up with their recommendations to Harwit
in July. Revisions were made but the veterans groups felt that their concerns over the
lack o f historical background leading up the Enola Gay*s mission and a dearth of
information about Japanese aggression were not being adequately addressed. They also
felt that the post-war nuclear age information was at best peripheral to any
commemoration of the end o f World War EL53 These concerns led to the formation of a
six-member ‘Tiger Team” at the request of Harwit himself. The members o f the team
were Brigadier General William M. Constantine, USAF (Ret.), volunteer NASM docent
and Team Chairman; Colonel Thomas Alison, USAF (Ret.), NASM Curator for Military
Aviation; Dr. Gregg Herken, Historian and Chairman, NASM Department o f Space
History; Colonel Donald Lopez, USAF (Ret.), former NASM Deputy Director and Senior

52U.S. Congress, Senate 1995, 28 - testimony of Gene Smith, President, AFA
53Ibid, 14 - testimony of Charles D. Cooper, Director of Publications, TROA
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Advisor Emeritus; Kenneth Robert, NASM volunteer docent; and Dr. Steven Soter,
Special Assistant to the Director, NASM and Team Secretary. The team’s charge was to
review the entire script with a particular eye for imbalance in the portrayal of the Japanese
and the Americans.54
In reviewing the report submitted by the ‘Tiger Team” investigating the 1994
script, it appears that the majority of the information that is in question is not related to
American perceptions o f war. In fact, according to that report, information relating to the
American memory seems to be missing from the exhibit entirely:
Imbalance: Treatment of Japanese vs. U.S. home fronts. Descriptions of Japanese
homefront in 1945 convey an overly sympathetic tone in comparison with the U.S.
The text cites specific examples o f hardship, shortages o f food and clothing, and
deprivation among the Japanese. In contrast, “Homefront U.S.A.” is likely to be
perceived by the viewing public as a land o f high wages and good times. There is
little or no mention o f grief at losses o f loved ones, numbers o f American
casualties, or other sympathetic examples of personal hardship and suffering on
the U.S. homefront. The text needs to say more than “Americans were tired of the
War” to balance perceptions o f the home fronts.55
The term “imbalance” appears repeatedly in the report, and after several pages becomes
the battle cry of the review team. They perceived the script as imbalanced, heavily
favoring the Japanese perspective of the Pacific Theater in 1945 and the aftermath of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is not surprising that many veterans were offended by the
exhibit as there appears to be little if any of the expected American narrative in the text the approval of Truman’s decision to drop the bomb and the acceptance of the higher

^Report of the National Air and Space Museum Review Team,
http://www.afa.org/enolagay/05-03.html, May 25, 1994, 1.
55Ibid, 2.
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death toll estimates provided to the public in 1945 are absent from the discussion. In fact,
one o f the major stumbling blocks of the exhibit negotiations centered around death toll
estimates that were significantly lower than those o f 500,000 to one million released
publicly by the Truman administration.56 Though most veterans were opposed to the use
of current historical information about the use of nuclear weapons in Japan, others like
Lloyd Cutler, a member of the Army Special Branch, had special insight into the use of
the atomic bomb on Japan:
We knew from the Japanese messages that they had authorized their ambassador
in Moscow . . . to open negotiations for peace. The Russians never told us, but we
knew . . . Averell Harriman and others argued against [using the bomb] since
Japan was ready to surrender anyway. They didn’t prevail.57
Cutler went on to state his approval for the bombing of Hiroshima, despite his knowledge
of Japan’s plans to surrender. In his mind Hiroshima served as a deterrent against using
nuclear weapons because of the horrible destruction and loss of life. However, he was
not. in favor of the second bombing. In contrast, Charles Briscoe, who participated in the
initial development of the B-29 bomber, echoed the sentiments o f many vets in the
Pacific theater saying he “realized it was sad that all those Japanese died, but how many
Americans would have been killed without the atomic bomb?”58 This question is central
to the argument surrounding the 1994 and 1995 scripts’ data about the decision to drop
the bomb and in retrospect it is clear that the controversy surrounding the death toll

561995 exhibit script
57Tom Brokaw, The Greatest Generation (New York: Random House, Inc, 1998),
367.
58Ibid, 94.
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numbers indicates those figures were not as clearly defined as the American public was
originally led to believe.
Had the Smithsonian made it a priority to gather oral histories from veterans and
their families and from the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and their families they
would have discovered a complex interwoven tale that while sparking controversy
because of the different memories and consequences of these events would also have
enriched the exhibit experience. Oral history is “one part of the struggle of memory
against forgetting, where people talk about the past - and others listen to remember.”59 It
plays an important role in gathering the memories o f those who participated in significant
historical events. Studs Terkel and Tom Brokaw, author o f The Greatest Generation.
both focus on World War II in their books which together include interviews of almost
two hundred people, men and women, famous and ordinary. These interviews give the
reader almost two hundred perspectives on World War II - many of them may echo
similar sentiments, but they each witnessed and experienced the war in their own
individual way. Though Brokaw has selected a celebratory perspective for his oral
history and Terkel a more critical and broad-based selection, the two are careful to let
their subjects do the talking and not guide the responses.
Collecting memories through oral history is important, but it is also complicated
by the passage of time and the influence of mitigating factors (like the media, fiction, etc.)
on individual memories. The trauma of events like war can make remembering them
difficult at best; sometimes it is easier to adopt others’ memories (even fictional ones)
59Michael Staub, “Speak Memory,” The Nation, 16 September 1991, 309.
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than to recall one’s own experiences. Using oral history is helpful, particularly because it
personalizes events that may not be familiar to everyone. Terkel introduces his collection
by explaining its significance:
The memory o f the rifleman is what this book is about; and o f his sudden
comrades, thrown, hugger-mugger, together; and of those men, women, and
children on the home front who knew or did not know what the shouting was all
about; and of occasional actors from other worlds, accidentally encountered; and
of lives lost and bucks found. And o f a moment in history [that to many is] just a
story in the past.60
Those, like Terkel and Brokaw, who collect oral history may also be biased by
information they are specifically looking for - they may choose to incorporate or leave out
stories based on the narrative they are trying to create. In some instances the usefulness
of oral history is overshadowed by the collector’s manipulation, so it should never be the
sole source o f historical information
Knowing that the NASM initially planned only to collect the memories that were
focused on the horrific experience o f war on the Japanese homefront in World War II - a
war which culminated in the destruction o f two cities by atomic bombs - might change
one’s viewpoint of the controversy that swirled around the exhibit. Perhaps the outrage
of veterans at an exhibit about the war which has no resonance with their memories of
that event might be more justified in light of that revelation. Alternately, although the
original 1994 script may have been flawed, the 1995 draft would certainly have created a
more personal and inspiring exhibit than the design which eventually won out and existed
at the Smithsonian until May 1998. The exhibit format that finally “won” was introduced
^Studs Terkel, ‘T he Good War”: An Oral History o f World War II (New York:
The New Press, 1984), 3.
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at its entrance with a letter from Secretary Heyman noting the controversy surrounding
the Enola Gay. The entrance hall included photographs of different types o f bombers
including the year o f construction for each model and what their capabilities were. The
fuselage of the Enola Gay, with its distinctive “R” marking is reconstructed in the next
room, and it is accompanied by an explanation of its markings and by some glass cases
with original plane components. The following room has a video about the restoration of
the plane and some large black and white pictures of the crew. The largest room in the
exhibition contains the bomb bay with the casings for Little Boy and Fat Man. Extensive
information on the 509th Bomber Group and the training on Tinian is presented on the
wall panels, which include more pictures o f the crew and the plane. The final room of the
exhibit is papered with newspaper headlines about the dropping o f the bomb and Japan’s
surrender. In this room visitors can watch a thirteen minute video about the crew of the
plane.61
The 1995 exhibit (which never came to be) presented a well-rounded view of
both the Japanese and American home fronts, and gave important background
information about the hostilities between the U.S. and Japan leading up to the Hiroshima
bombing. However, the Veterans o f Foreign Wars and the Air Force Association would
not budge from their belief that the Smithsonian was deliberately trying to undermine the
nation’s glorious, patriotic memories of World War II. When Smithsonian Secretary I.
Michael Heyman refused to support Martin O. Harwit, the director of the NASM, Harwit
resigned and Heyman took on the exhibit, reducing it to the sterile display that was
61My personal photographs and notes from the exhibit.
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opened to the public.
The lesson that museums have very explicitly learned in the aftermath of the
Enola Gay exhibit is that “politics can be brought to bear to shape historical
interpretation.”62 Cultural institutions alone are simply not able to resolve conflicting
opinions about particular wartime acts, and because of those debates there is little hope of
using a federally funded museum as a staging ground for a thought-provoking excursion
into the recent past. The possibility o f any rational exchange o f ideas is eliminated when
lobbying a congressperson becomes the preferred method of expressing discontent with
an exhibit’s planned content. Now that the lifeless NASM exhibit has been closed (for
roof repairs to that wing o f the building), the Enola Gay's future home will be in an
airport. Dulles International Airport in Chantilly, Virginia plans to open an NASM annex
in 2003; the completely assembled Enola Gay will be displayed there.
The Vietnam Era Educational Center
Despite the seeming inability of historians and veterans to agree on how to present
war in a public forum such as a museum, there is one exhibit which has defied the odds
and meshed conflicting viewpoints, but not without dispute. In 1995, around the time the
Enola Gay exhibition opened, a group of Atlantic City casinos announced they were
donating $3.8 million to finance the construction o f the nation’s first museum committed
to memorializing the Vietnam War. Located in Holmdel, New Jersey, next to the New
Jersey Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial, the Vietnam Era Educational Center is “a place

62Linenthal & Engelhardt, 153-4.
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dedicated to the meaning, as well as to the memory, of the Vietnam conflict.”63
Describing the center’s mission seems easy now, but in the three years following the
announcement of the casinos’ gift, a vicious debate raged “between those who believe
that the war was profoundly imm oral. . . and those who believe that the failure to pursue
the war to military victory was evidence of moral failure, that the peace movement sold
the nation down the drain.”64
The committee originally charged with planning the content o f the center
comprised academic historians, political scientists, teachers, veterans, and museum
specialists. Though the specific details are unclear because o f the unwillingness of
original committee members to place blame, what is evident is that one or more members
of the original committee were not happy with the way veterans were portrayed in the
initial script. According to committee member and historian Howard Green, pieces of the
text were selectively leaked by one or more o f the displeased committee members to the
local veterans’ community and the media in an attempt to create a firestorm which would
either completely alter the script or scrap the idea altogether. When the controversy hit,
the committee, which originally had five Vietnam veterans, one Korean war veteran and
11 non-veterans, was modified to include eight more Vietnam veterans and one less nonvet65, bringing the totals to 14 and 10 respectively. Its task was to examine the script and

63Vietnam Era Educational Center Visitor’s brochure
64Amy Westfeldt, The Associated Press, “First Vietnam era museum opens after
years of debate,” The Daily Press, 27 September 1998, A5.
65Information about the identity of the one committee member who left was not
made available. It is unclear whether this non-veteran decided to leave voluntarily or was
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make suitable alterations. The NASM scrapped its original concept altogether in favor of
an exhibit about the B-29 bomber that almost entirely avoided the subject of nuclear
weapons. The Vietnam Era Educational Center could not avoid the Vietnam War, so its
revision committee rewrote “every word of the museum’s text panels, and argu[ed] about
the role o f the media, the legitimacy of the anti-war movement and whether the war could
have been won.”66 From 1995 until 1998, the committee worked hard to hammer out
disagreements and create what they felt was a well-balanced, thought-provoking exhibit.
Unfortunately, some critics like Vietnam expert Robert Brigham, felt that the
committee “tried so hard to be objective that it failed to make a point.”67 The center’s
discussion of anti-war protests was criticized by many scholars, including Mitchell Hall,
because “it overemphasizes the militant fringe wing and de-emphasizes the moderate
mainstream.”68 Even in an exhibit that was broken down and rebuilt by a committee
created for the sole purpose o f bringing balance some groups’ voices are privileged over
the voices of others. An interview with Green, who was one of three committee members
chosen to edit the final script, helped to crystallize some of the main issues surrounding
the exhibit. Green believes strongly that the committee should have chosen “a ranking
scholar rather than a graduate student”69 to write the initial script - Meredith H. Lair, a

asked to resign from the committee.
“ Westfeldt, A5
67Ibid.
68Ibid.
69Green, Howard, phone interview with author 9/15/99
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graduate student in the history department at Penn State University, was chosen by the
original committee for her balanced perspective. Lair’s father was a Vietnam veteran and
she was studying under Professor Bill Duiker, author o f The Communist Road to Power
in Vietnam. Vietnam: Revolution in Transition, and Sacred War: Nationalism and
Revolution in a Divided Vietnam. When her original script, which Green thought was
not very problematic, was intentionally leaked to the local media and the veterans’
community, a few “unfriendlies”70 sought to create an Enola Gay-type controversy.
Although members o f the press attended the first few content committee meetings, they
soon became bored with the proceedings, for the script was reviewed word by word.
3

According to Green, the major problem the committee faced was overcoming.the concept
of “one voice for all veterans.” Those who felt that voice was being lost monopolized the
debate with lots of small matters, but they could not derail the process. The My Lai
massacre was “one of the sorest points . . . [with much debate about] how to characterize
what its moral was.”71 Ultimately, the final script only addressed the discovery of the
incident and the embarrassment it brought to most Vietnam soldiers. Another major
controversy arose over the size of the anti-war organization Vietnam Veterans Against the
War (W A W ). Green was disappointed by the desire of many committee members to
downplay the organization and therefore minimize any discussion of anti-war sentiment
among veterans. The irony of the painstaking months spent on the label text is that it
comprises only a fraction of the center. Photos, video, and artifacts all have a much

70Green, 9/15/99
71Ibid
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greater impact on visitors, says Green, who is featured as the lone anti-war talking head in
the video sequence, and there was much less struggle over the visual components of the
center.72
Many of the potential debates the museum could have sparked were dealt with in
the revision committee, and there appear to be few imbalances in the exhibits. Some
critics charged that the exhibit failed to address the anti-war movement from all
perspectives. America’s domestic situation is covered in great detail, from Johnson’s
Great Society plans, to the Civil Rights Movement and Watergate. Veterans felt that the
original text was unfavorable to American military personnel and overemphasized the
anti-war movement and drug use. Now, they are generally pleased to be able to visit the
center which displays “letters between soldiers and their families . . . videotaped
testimony by some veterans . . . [and] passages about its legacy, including post-traumatic
stress disorder, the effects of Agent Orange and the myth o f the Vietnam veteran as a
“dangerously violent, substance-abusing, stressed-out failure.”73 A pamphlet promoting
the center touts it as “a place dedicated to telling the full story o f the Vietnam War, as
seen from the front lines, as well as from the home front.”74 One prominently bold
typeset line in the visitor’s brochure states “From land mines to peace signs,” seemingly
indicating the inclusiveness o f the material presented at the center. However, though the

72Watts, Kelly, phone interview with author, 9/8/99.
73The Vietnam Era Educational Center Visitor’s Brochure. Holmdel: Princeton
Partners, Inc., 1998.
74Ibid.
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center further includes its visitors by inviting veterans and their families and friends to
submit photographs, letters, and other materials to the museum’s collection, and
encouraging Vietnam veterans to become volunteer docents, there are no similar
invitations to those who protested the war.
Conclusion
None of these exhibits and memorials escaped controversy unscathed. The
Vietnam Veterans Memorial added an American flag, the phrase ‘God Bless America,’
and a statue o f three soldiers before it opened in 1982. Since that time another statue of
Vietnam’s female veterans has been added. The original Enola Gay exhibit and its
exploration o f nuclear destruction was done away with in favor of a more technical
display of the plane. The Vietnam Era Educational Center label text took three years to
rewrite before it was acceptable to the revision committee. In each of these three cases,
as in so many other instances, the “powerful and dominant interests of patriots and
nationalists could not let a text composed only by and about ordinary people and ordinary
emotions stand alone.”75 Special interest groups like the VFW, the American Legion, and
TROA more often than not are represented by prominent politicians and powerful
lobbying groups, both o f which insist that they are the guardians of the one and only truth.
It is this insistence on control o f information and concomitant limiting of opinions
available to the broader public that frustrates the possibilities for maximizing the
educational value of war exhibits. Scholar George Lipsitz discusses the importance of
realizing that there is no single story to be told in his work stressing that “the plurality of
75Bodnar, 6
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views provoked [by an exhibit leaves] no one correct [meaning], but, instead, provide[s] a
locus o f meanings intersecting around the content. . . and the lived experiences of its
viewers.”76 Simply stated, there is an intrinsic value in incorporating as many varying
perspectives as possible in an exhibit. Rather than watering down the presentation, such
an approach enriches it by presenting divergent ideas and offering a diverse group of
people the opportunity to explore different opinions.
If we want to educate ourselves about the myths and realities o f war, if we want to
honor veterans and acknowledge the decisions o f policy makers, if we want to open up a
forum for discussion and debate of a past that is at once distant and oppressive, then we
must acknowledge the power of presenting the facts as we know them alongside the latest
scholarship and the personal stories from those who were ‘there.’ Until we can accept the
existence of many divergent perspectives, the controversies over intention that have
plagued war exhibits and memorials for the past twenty years will continue. Though
multiple voices may prevent Americans from achieving a single national identity, they
enrich vistors’ experiences and add to their collective understanding o f U.S. history.
In the aftermath of the Enola Gay exhibit, the National Museum o f American
History (NMAH) staged their own exhibition commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of
the end o f World War II. It was titled “World War Hr Sharing Memories.” In describing
the aim of this exhibit, curator Steven Lubar comments:
We all do remember the war. We remember it in family stories, national
mythology, the history we learned in school, and the movies we saw on television
76George Lipsitz, Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular
Culture. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1990), xv.
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. . . We wanted our visitors to think not only about the war but also about how we
know the past, about the ways that memory and tradition relate to history and
historic artifacts.77
The NMAH used objects o f everyday life to encourage museum visitors to relate their
feelings about and experiences during the war, and then they collected those memories in
notebooks positioned throughout the exhibit. The stories they collected ranged from
heroic events to tragic loss, but the collection of these memories proved that Americans
felt an incredible connectedness to World War II; even those Americans who had not
been bom during the era had some recollection o f the war passed down from parents and
grandparents. The mission o f this exhibit was to give museum visitors the opportunity to
remember in their own way and museum curators the opportunity to collect those
memories. It successfully created an interactive environment which gave everyone who
encountered the exhibit the opportunity to participate, to remember, to relate, and to learn
from each other.78
In writing about the failures of the Enola Gay exhibit, historian Tom Engelhardt
contends that it is no longer possible to “approach a memorial to war dead as if entering a
glorious story in which individual sacrifice led to national enhancement.”79 Engelhardt’s
statement also applies to the exhibition o f war artifacts and memorabilia. When
museums and memorials “talk about” or “represent” war they have to engage with at least

77Henderson & Kaeppler, 15.
78Ibid.
79Edward Linenthal & Tom Engelhardt, eds., History Wars: The Enola Gay and
Other Battles for the American Past. “The Victors and the Vanquished,: by Tom
Engelhardt (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 221.
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two languages:
Official culture relies on ‘dogmatic formalism’ and the restatement of reality in
ideal rather than complex or ambiguous terms . . . Vernacular culture . . .
represents an array of special interests that are grounded in parts o f the whole.
They are diverse and changing and can be reformulated from time to time by the
creation of new social units . . . They can even clash with one another.80
Official cultural renditions o f conflicts often neglect the personal, human stories in favor
of the ‘God and country* approach to the sacrifices of war. In contrast, vernacular
cultural representational philosophies emphasize the importance of approaching war from
all sides, stirring up conflicting viewpoints, opening old wounds, and questioning
accepted truths. It is possible to live in both o f those cultures, and that is how museums
should begin to approach their exhibits of war. Rather than fearing the conflicting
perspectives and emotions that multiple people bring to any memorial or museum,
museum curators, scholars, veterans, and politicians should relish the opportunity to hear
as many different realities as possible and to catalog them all for the human record. For
some, the war experience must remain private and unarticulated. But that does not mean
that war exhibits must be devoid of emotion. Individuals can and will bring their own
memories and derive their own meaning from what they are viewing. Museum-goers
need to be credited with the ability to view something that elicits more than one possible
response. As one curator noted, more often than not,
the public is demanding to be considered a partner in the creation of meaning.
This is good, but the trick is how to share authority with our public while not
simply abandoning the job of the curator and the historian to those who have the
political clout to demand that their own historical truths . . . be given the

80Bodnar, 13-4.
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museum’s endorsement.81
Museums are now in a position to tell a many-sided story, drawing on veterans’
first-hand accounts, government documents, print and broadcast media archives,
memories of soldiers’ relatives, letters, and many other untapped resources. As scholars
Amy Henderson and Adrienne Kaeppler maintain, “the debate over history and memory
has illustrated at least one truth: Today there is no single, overarching agreement on
historical truth. And because there are many histories, it follows that there are many ways
of understanding.”82 It is unthinkable, for instance, that curators or exhibit creators would
presume to tell the story of any war without considering the home fronts of all nations
involved. The Enola Gay cannot be reasonably discussed without talking about
Hiroshima or Pearl Harbor, nor can a museum focusing on Vietnam not incorporate both
the death of innocent Vietnamese civilians and the terror and the loss o f life during the
stress that American soldiers in Vietnam dealt with every day. Vietnam veterans’
participation in the conflict cannot be memorialized without also some reference to
sacrifices that will always be grieved and never be celebrated.
A war is not merely a series of battles or a conflict of ideologies; war cannot be
discussed simply in terms o f territory won and lost or the number of casualties on either
side. War affects everyone and everything, from military personnel and their families to
industry and the economy. There is no single truth to war; rather there are multiple truths,
each reflecting the experiences of an individual or group of people. Mounting a

8,Henderson & Kaeppler, 24.
“ Ibid, 4-5.
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successful exhibition means acknowledging the fact that there are many stories to be told
and making every effort not to privilege one over another. Curators, historians, and
veterans must work together to ensure that many divergent voices are heard in war
exhibits. Both the official and the vernacular cultures must be acknowledged in order to
appropriately recognize the sacrifice of veterans and to finally accept the United States’
ignominious defeats alongside its glorious victories.
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